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IN rfHE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GENE vVHEADON and
DEANE WHEADON, his wife,
Pluintiffs and Appellants,

Case

vs.

No. 9696

GEORGE B. PEARSON and
SARAH K. PEARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The plaintiffs respectfully petition the Court for a
rehearing of the issues presented to the Court on this
appeal, for the reasons hereafter set forth.
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I

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO
JOIN T'HE CLAIMS IN QUESTION AND SHOULD NOT
BE PENALIZED FOR NOT DOING SO.

The under lying rationale of the Court's opinion on
this appeal apparently is that because plaintiffs were permitted under our rules to join both of the causes of action
in question in one lawsuit, they were required to do so.
It is respectfully submitted that the decisions from other
jurisdictions, including those whose rules are similar to
ours, are to the contrary.
For example, the annotation at 86 ALR 2d 1385
collects a number of cases in which courts have held that
an action for malicious prosecution and an action for false
arrest involve different causes of action and that a plaintiff, having either succeeded or failed in the one, may
maintain the other in a separate suit. The case which
leads the annotation is an especially strong holding to
that effect. Two of the decisions collected are from federal district courts, operating under rules substantially
identical to ours.
In one of these, Gore v. Gorman's, Inc. (1956, DC
Mo) 148 F Supp 241, the defendant had procured plaintiff's
arrest on an alleged insufficient funds check in an effort
to collect an account which plaintiff owed defendant.
Plaintiff then sued defendant on a malicious prosecution
cause of action and recovered judgment, which was satisfied. Plaintiff then brought the above-cited action, a
second and separate suit, on an abuse of process cause of
2
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action. The defendant claimed the former suit was a bar.
The court held that it was not, stating (at p. 244):
As to contention "2"-that the action is res judicata
-or barred by the judgment heretofore entered,
it is the opinion of the court that the action sought
to be maintained against the defendants at this
time is entirely separate and distinct from the
cause of action heretofore prosecuted against the
defendants, although some of the relevant facts
were considered in that case. Certainly there is a
distinction between an action for malicious prosecution, and an action for abuse of process, for even
false arrest, and the plaintiff had a right to main-

tain the actions separate and distinct from each
other. That contention must be ruled against the
said defendants. (Emphasis added)
The second such case is Robinson v. Chicago Great
Western R. Co. (1956, DC Mo) 144 F Supp 713, where the
plaintiff brought a second suit for false imprisonment,
having previously secured judgment against the same defendant for malicious prosecution. The court first pointed
out that the causes of action for malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment were quite different, comprised of
different elements and, among other things, subject to
different defenses. After some discussion of election of
remedies, the court stated (at p. 716):
If plaintiff, through misconception or mistake,
pursues an action' for false imprisonment, and ultimately loses, he should not be barred from pros-·
ecuting an action based upon the correct theory.
There is no substantial reason why plaintiff in
good faith <mnnat pursUle two apparent, but incensistenrt,~ theories up to such· time as. all ueasonable
uncertainty disappears as to. which theory or eause
of action fs the correct one. The reason given in
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support of this rule is that the prosecution of a
wrong remedy to defeat will not estop a party
from subsequently pursuing the right one to victory.
Both foregoing cases were decided by courts operating
under Rule 18(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
its provisions are identical with the provisions of Rule
18(a), U.R.C.P. It is respectfully submitted that since we
are dealing in this case with separate and distinct causes
of action rather than with different statements of the
same cause of action, Rule 18(a) is the one more directly
in point.
By comparison with the foregoing, the facts of the
instant case are a fortiori in favor of the plaintiffs. In
those cases, the causes of action arose out of the same
identical transaction or occurrence; in this case the facts
giving rise to the causes of action are distinct, and separated in time.
II
THE DECISION DEPARTS FROM THE FORMER
HOLDINGS OF THIS COURT.
In the opinion filed in this case, the Court quotes and
emphasizes certain language from its decision in the East
Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City case, 108 U. 315,
159 P. 2d 863. Within the same quote, but not emphasized,
is the language which seems to reach the heart of this
case. In stating that res judicata "applies not only to
points and issues which are actually raised and decided
therein, but also to such as could have been therein adju4
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dicated," did not the Court mean points and issues pertaining to that cause of action, as stated by those pleadings?
If not, why the following language " ... but it only
applies where the claim, demand, or cause of action is the
same in both cases."?
In a 1955 case, Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4
U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Crockett, adopted the following statement from a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court:
But where the second action between the same
parties is upon a different claim or demand, the
judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which
the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases,
therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel
of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action
to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause
of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point
or question actually litigated and determined in the
original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is
the judgment conclusive in another action. (Emphasis added)
To say that a judgment is res judicata as to all matters that could have been adjudicated, without limiting it
to those points relevant to the cause of action stated in
the pleadings, a~ounts to compulsory joinder and makes
a shambles of Rule 18(a).
Mr. Cleary makes this point in his article, cited by
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the court. Cleary, Res Judicata Re-examined, 57 Yale L.J.
339, He says, at p. 346:
Here it is important to distinguish compulsory
joinder from permissive joinder of the subject
matter of litigation. A literal reading of the rule
that res judicata applies not only to what was litigated but to what might have been litigated, as
well, would mean that all procedurally joinable
matters between the parties at the time of the
former action would now be res judicata, regardless of how unrelated such matters might be in
fact. Courts have not gone to that length. They
have said that what might have been litigated in
the first action is res judicata only to the extent
that it constituted a part of the cause of action
involved in the first action. If the causes of action
are different, it is immaterial then that plaintiff
might have joined them under rules governing
permissive joinder. Now the purpose of liberality
in joinder rules is the same as the anti-vexatiouslitigation purpose of the rule of res judicata, i.e. to
encourage litigants to reduce the numerical volume
of lawsuits by bringing more disputed matters into
the same action. Yet when plaintiff seeks to make
two lawsuits do the work of one, the rule of res
judicata applies too harsh a penalty (complete loss
of plaintiff's right of recovery), and permissive
joinder too slight a penalty (some added inconvenience and expense to plaintiff, which he incurs
voluntarily). And so we find a deserving plaintiff
denied recovery of very apparent damages for
breach of contract because the contract was "entire,'' and in a former action he had not included
damages for anticipatory breach, thus "splitting his
cause of action," while in another case plaintiff is
permitted to bring as many actions as he holds
bonds and coupons of the same identical issue,
because each bond and coupon "constitutes a separate cause of action."'
6
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SUMMARY
The facts, transactions, occurrences, or whatever they
might be called, which gave rise to plaintiffs' cause of action as asserted in this suit were wholly prior in time and
separate from those which gave rise to the prescriptive
right cause of action set forth in their first suit. The defendants have not been troubled by "vexatious litigation"
since the matter was first disposed of by summary judgment in the trial court. To hold that res judicata is a bar
against plaintiffs in this present suit is to depart from
the prior holdings of this Court and from the almost unan·imous weight of authority from other jurisdictions.
It is sincerely urged that this Court should reexamine
the principles underlying its prior holding herein, and
grant the re-hearing now prayed for.
Respectfully submitted,
K. R.OGER BEAN
BEAN AND BEAN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants

50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
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